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COMMENT
USING CONTRACT LAW TO RESOLVE FROZEN PRE-EMBRYO
DISPUTES
ALLYSON WADE*
In vitro fertilization is important in the lives of many families.1 Lesley
Brown, mother of the first child conceived through in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”), told her daughter Louise before she died that “without IVF she
wouldn’t have anybody left in the world.”2 Since that first conception in the
1970s, the use of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) like IVF has
grown.3 In 2019, approximately 2.1% of children born were conceived
through ART, mostly through IVF.4 Those IVF treatments create multiple
pre-embryos,5 but couples are often able to conceive without using all of the
©2022 Allyson Wade.
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1. Ciara Nugent, What It Was Like to Grow Up as the World’s First ‘Test-Tube Baby,’ TIME
(July 25, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://time.com/5344145/louise-brown-test-tube-baby/.
2. Id.
3. ART Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%
2Fart%2Freports%2Findex.html
[http://web.archive.org/web/20220218160610/https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html?CDC_
AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fart%2Freports%2Findex.html] (last visited Feb.
18, 2022).
4. Id.
5. This Comment uses the term “pre-embryo,” as did the Jocelyn P. court, because it more
accurately refers to the time when pre-embryos are frozen: between fertilization and when “a single
primitive streak” appears that indicates “a single biologic individual is in the process of formation.”
Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Charlotte Schrader, And Just What Is a Pre-Embryo?, 52 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 189, 190 (1989); see also Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 445–46 n.3, 250
A.3d 373, 379–80 n.3 (2021). This “primitive streak” typically develops between twelve and
sixteen days after fertilization, Jones & Schrader, supra, and IVF pre-embryos are typically frozen
five to seven days after fertilization. See, e.g., Mindy Christianson, Freezing Embryos, JOHNS
HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/freezing-
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pre-embryos created.6 The remaining pre-embryos are usually frozen for
later use.7 One study estimated that one million pre-embryos were frozen in
2012,8 although the actual number is likely much higher, and additional
embryos have been cryopreserved in the decade since that study.9 Those
frozen embryos can remain viable for a long time, at least as long as twentyseven years.10 But as couples who have both contributed gametes to create
frozen pre-embryos disagree on whether to use or dispose of them, courts are
being asked to decide who gets the pre-embryos and how, if at all, those preembryos can be used.11
In a case of first impression, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
recently addressed the novel issue of how to resolve the disposition of frozen
pre-embryos upon divorce.12 The court adopted a blended contractual and
balancing approach, whereby the court would enforce any prior agreement
regarding the disposition of the pre-embryos.13 When there is no prior
agreement between the parties, the court held it would balance the interest of
one party to avoid procreation against the interest of the other party to have
a biological child.14
This Comment will first describe the facts presented in Jocelyn P. v.
Joshua P.,15 the three major approaches taken by courts who have addressed
pre-embryo disputes,16 and the approach the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals ultimately adopted.17 This Comment will then explain why the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals correctly adopted the blended contractual

embryos
[https://web.archive.org/web/20211008060031/https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment
-tests-and-therapies/freezing-embryos] (last visited Feb. 18, 2022); Frozen Embryo Transfer,
ASPIRE FERTILITY, https://www.aspirefertility.com/fertility-treatment/ivf/fet-frozen-embryotransfer
[http://web.archive.org/web/20220211100441/https://www.aspirefertility.com/fertilitytreatment/ivf/fet-frozen-embryo-transfer] (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
6. Geoffrey P. Lomax & Alan O. Trounson, Correcting Misperceptions About Cryopreserved
Embryos and Stem Cell Research, 31 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 288, 288 (2013).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; Dave Snow, Alana Cattapan & Françoise Baylis, Contesting Estimates of
Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 909, 909 (2015).
10. Holly Honderich, Baby Girl Born from Record-Setting 27-Year-Old Embryo, BBC (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55164607.
11. See, e.g., Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 250 A.3d 373 (2021).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 486, 250 A.3d at 404.
14. Id.
15. See infra Section I.A.
16. See infra Section I.B.
17. See infra Section I.C.
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and balancing approach,18 rather than striking down such contracts for
violating public policy.19 Lastly, it will argue that the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals should have gone further in upholding contracts regarding
the disposition of pre-embryos and engaged in a more thorough analysis of
contract doctrine.20
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jocelyn P. and Joshua P.’s Case
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals recently addressed how to
resolve disputes about the disposition of frozen pre-embryos in Jocelyn P. v.
Joshua P.21 Like many cases involving frozen pre-embryos, the case was not
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 22 making the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals’ opinion the highest authority on this question in
Maryland.23 Also like many other cases, the Jocelyn P. case involved a
couple who faced infertility and had undergone invasive and extensive IVF
procedures to achieve their goal of having a family.24
Jocelyn and Joshua married in 2010 and were not able to successfully
conceive a child through coitus in the first two years of their marriage.25 In
2012, Jocelyn was diagnosed with “[p]rimary infertility” and “[p]ossibly
unexplained infertility.”26 Between 2013 and 2015, Jocelyn and Joshua

18. See infra Section II.A.
19. See infra Section II.B.
20. See infra Section II.C.
21. 250 Md. App. 435, 250 A.3d 373 (2021).
22. See infra Appendix A. Thus far, nineteen states have cases and/or statutes relating to the
disposition of frozen pre-embryos. See infra Appendix A. Only nine state supreme courts have
ruled on the matter. See infra Appendix A.
23. See Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. 435, 250 A.3d 373.
24. Id. at 449, 250 A.3d at 381.
25. Id. at 448, 250 A.3d at 381.
26. Id. (alterations in original).
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attempted intrauterine insemination27 seven times, but these procedures were
unsuccessful.28
Toward the end of 2015, Jocelyn and Joshua decided to undergo IVF to
conceive a child.29 Jocelyn testified that she was hesitant to undergo IVF due
to her religious beliefs, and that she and Joshua discussed “at length” that
they would use every pre-embryo because they believed that they had created
life and needed to give every embryo the opportunity of life.30 The couple
entered into a contract with the fertility clinic that gave informed consent to
the IVF procedures and addressed storage and disposition of the preembryos.31 The IVF contract said that the “main goal of IVF is to allow a
patient the opportunity to become pregnant using her own eggs and sperm
from her partner or from a donor.”32 It allowed the parties to choose the preembryos’ disposition upon death of one of the parties,33 but otherwise the
language was drafted by the fertility clinic and the couple was not offered an
opportunity to change the language.34 The IVF contract stated:
It is the policy of [the IVF clinic] that embryos produced by the
joining of eggs and sperm are subject to disposition in a manner
mutually agreed upon by the partners. Where donor eggs or
sperm are being used, the embryos are subject to disposition in a
manner mutually agreed upon by the couple receiving IVF services
at the site, except in the cases of divorce. In the event of a divorce
if one of the partners produced the gametes (sperm or eggs) then
the producer shall have the sole decision-making authority over the
disposition of the embryos. . . . I/we (The Couple) understand and
agree that if any dispute arises between the two of us regarding the
disposition of the embryos, [the IVF clinic] is authorized, in its sole
discretion, to refrain from taking any action unless and until
27. Commonly referred to as “artificial insemination,” intrauterine insemination is a procedure
whereby sperm is placed directly into the uterus in order to fertilize ova. Intrauterine Insemination
(IUI), MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/intrauterineinsemination/about/pac-20384722
[https://web.archive.org/web/20220201040445/https://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/intrauterine-insemination/about/pac-20384722]. By contrast, IVF is where ova are
extracted and fertilized by sperm outside of the uterus, allowed to develop into pre-embryos, and
then transferred into a uterus. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716
[https://web.archive.org/web/20220125181835/https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/invitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716].
28. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 448–49, 250 A.3d at 381.
29. Id. at 449, 250 A.3d at 381.
30. Id. at 455, 494, 250 A.3d at 385, 408.
31. Id. at 449–51, 250 A.3d at 381–83.
32. Id. at 449, 250 A.3d at 381–82.
33. Id. at 451, 250 A.3d at 382.
34. Id. at 493, 250 A.3d at 408.
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otherwise directed by a final judgement of a court of competent
jurisdiction or by another agreement signed by both partners.35
Jocelyn testified that the IVF procedures took a great physical and
emotional toll on her.36 She described the inability to conceive as “absolutely
devastating.”37 Physically, she experienced “gut wrenching pain. . . . like
you got kicked in the gut really hard but from the inside,” her hair fell out,
she became “extremely thin,” and she “had awful gout pain in [her] toe.”38
The procedures also took up much of her time; Jocelyn testified she went to
“hundreds” of appointments, and that the “sheer number of appointments
required her to work part-time.”39 From those IVF procedures, three preembryos were created.40 The first was implanted but resulted in
miscarriage.41 The second was successfully implanted in January of 2016
and resulted in the couple’s only child.42 The third pre-embryo remained
frozen for later use.43
Jocelyn and Joshua experienced marital difficulties that came to a head
in July of 2017 when they were engaged in an argument that required police
intervention.44 After that argument, Jocelyn left their home and obtained a
protective order against Joshua, which was later reversed.45 Both parties then
sought a divorce.46 The parties reached a settlement on all issues except for
the disposition of the third frozen pre-embryo.47
Jocelyn and Joshua transferred the third frozen pre-embryo from the
fertility clinic to a cryobank in June of 2020.48 The couple entered into an
agreement with the cryobank that addressed the disposition of the frozen preembryo upon divorce.49 That agreement stated that in the event of divorce,
ownership of the pre-embryos would be determined by a divorce decree or
other legally binding document, unless the couple provided different
instructions with both of their notarized signatures to the cryobank.50
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 450, 250 A.3d at 382.
Id. at 455, 250 A.3d at 385.
Id.
Id. at 455–56, 250 A.3d at 385–86 (alteration in original).
Id. at 456, 250 A.3d at 386.
Id. at 451, 250 A.3d at 383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452, 250 A.3d at 383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451, 250 A.3d at 383.
Id. at 462, 250 A.3d at 389.
Id.
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B. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ Options
The disposition of frozen pre-embryos upon divorce was a case of first
impression in Maryland, but a number of other jurisdictions had addressed
the issue prior to Jocelyn P.51 Most courts first determine the legal status of
a pre-embryo as person, property, or sui generis to determine whether to
require the pre-embryo be brought to term, apply property law, or apply
court-made doctrine unique to pre-embryo disputes, respectively.52 A court
must then decide (1) whether and to what extent it will enforce contracts
regarding the disposition of pre-embryos, and (2) how it will resolve the
dispute when there is no valid contract.53 The methods courts take to resolve
these disputes have been categorized into three major approaches: (1) the
contractual approach, (2) the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, and
(3) the balancing approach.54 However, there can be many variations beyond
those three categories as courts often use a combination of those methods and
apply different standards within those approaches.55 Additionally, courts
may be limited in which approach to adopt by state statutes directly
governing pre-embryo disputes.56 Even absent statutes directly relating to
pre-embryo disputes, state statutes will often play a significant role in a
court’s decision about which approach to adopt, as courts will use state
statutes to evince whether the public policy of the state disfavors such
contracts.57
1. Legal Status of Pre-Embryos
As a preliminary matter, the legal status of a pre-embryo will guide
which body of law a court applies.58 Jurisdictions may afford pre-embryos
the rights of a person,59 treat pre-embryos like property,60 or indicate they are

51. See infra Appendix A.
52. See infra Section I.B.1.
53. See infra Section I.B.3.
54. See infra Section I.B.2.
55. See infra Section I.B.3.
56. See infra Section I.B.4.
57. See infra Section I.B.4.
58. Compare Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 468, 250 A.3d 373, 393 (2021)
(holding a pre-embryo is something between a “person” and “property” deserving special respect
and applying law unique to cryopreserved pre-embryos), with McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d
127, 149, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (holding pre-embryos are “marital property of a ‘special
character’” and applying state marital property laws).
59. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2018) (treating a pre-embryo as a “juridical person”).
60. E.g., In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he
contractual right to . . . dispose of the frozen embryos is personal property that is subject to a ‘just
and proper’ division . . . .”).
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unique or something in between the two (sui generis).61 Some jurisdictions
have also resolved pre-embryo disputes without deciding the legal status of
a pre-embryo.62 Disposal of pre-embryos is likely limited in jurisdictions that
treat pre-embryos as persons,63 although very few jurisdictions adopt this
approach.64 Most jurisdictions treat pre-embryos either as property or sui
generis,65 although even those jurisdictions that label pre-embryos as
property recognize that frozen pre-embryos are unique from other property.66
This distinction largely affects what body of law a court will ground its
decision in; courts that label pre-embryos as property are more likely to
invoke marital property law, while those that take the in-between approach
are more likely to invoke common law tests unique to this area.67 The legal
status of a pre-embryo as property or sui generis does not, however, predict
which of the three major approaches a court will adopt.68

61. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (“[P]reembryos are not, strictly
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life.”).
62. See infra Appendix A. Four jurisdictions have expressly declined to decide the legal status
of pre-embryos, see, for example, Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that preembryos are not “persons” but declining to decide whether pre-embryos are entitled to “special
respect”), while three jurisdictions failed to comment on the subject, see infra Appendix A.
63. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2018) (prohibiting destruction of pre-embryos).
64. See infra Appendix A. Only one jurisdiction, Louisiana, treats pre-embryos as a “juridical
person” by statute. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2018).
65. Seven jurisdictions treated pre-embryos as property and applied marital property law, while
four jurisdictions treated pre-embryos as something unique and applied court-made doctrine
developed specifically for pre-embryo disputes. See infra Appendix A. However, four of the
jurisdictions that treated pre-embryos as marital property did so because the parties had agreed to
that characterization, either in their IVF contract or in their court arguments. See, e.g., Jessee v.
Jessee, 866 S.E.2d 46, 49 (Va. Ct. App. 2021) (treating a pre-embryo as marital property because
the parties put the issue before the court under that framework but declining to decide the status of
a pre-embryo in the absence of a consensus between the parties). It is unclear whether those
jurisdictions would hold differently if the parties had disagreed on the legal status of the preembryos.
66. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)
(recognizing that case law regarding just and proper distribution of property offers little assistance
in distributing pre-embryos because “[t]he division of property rarely gives rise to this level of
deeply emotional conflict”); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding “frozen pre-embryos are entitled to special respect” and are “marital property of a ‘special
character’”).
67. Compare Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 468, 486, 250 A.3d 373, 393, 404
(2021) (identifying pre-embryos as sui generis and applying judge-made balancing test), with
McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 149, 151 (identifying pre-embryos as property and applying state marital
property laws).
68. Compare McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 151, 157 (treating pre-embryos as marital property and
upholding the trial court’s application of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach because
the trial court has discretion to award marital property as it deems just), with Reber v. Reiss, 42
A.3d 1131, 1133, 1136–37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (treating pre-embryos as marital property and
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2. The Three Major Approaches
Scholars and courts have described three major approaches courts take
to resolve disputes regarding the disposition of frozen pre-embryos: (1) the
contractual approach, (2) the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, and
(3) the balancing approach.69
i. The Contractual Approach
Under the contractual approach, a court looks for and enforces prior
agreements regarding the disposition of pre-embryos.70 Proponents of this
approach argue it encourages parties to think and talk through all possibilities
before engaging in IVF and cryopreservation, allows for predictability and
certainty for both the parties involved and pre-embryo storage facilities,
avoids costly litigation, and allows the parties to make the ultimate choice,
rather than a court.71 Those that oppose this approach argue that it is unfair
to bind individuals to prior decisions regarding reproduction.72 They argue
that it is inappropriate to enforce such an agreement because it is difficult to
predict one’s response to life altering events.73 Given that a person’s values
may change, opponents argue that upholding such agreements forces parties
to enter into parenthood against their will, undermining the right to privacy
and reproductive autonomy.74
Fourteen jurisdictions out of the nineteen that have addressed preembryo disputes uphold at least some contracts regarding the disposition of
pre-embryos.75 However, courts may differ on which contracts will be
enforced.76 For instance, some courts may enforce contracts when they
provide for disposal of a pre-embryo but not when they provide that a preembryo should be granted to a person who will implant it.77 Only seven
upholding the trial court’s application of the balancing approach because the trial court has the
discretion to award property as the equities require).
69. See, e.g., Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 468–86, 250 A.3d at 393–404; Carissa Pryor, What
to Expect when Contracting for Embryos, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, 1097–111 (2020).
70. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 469, 250 A.3d at 393; Pryor, supra note 69, at 1098.
71. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 469, 474–75, 250 A.3d at 393–94, 397.
72. Id. at 475, 250 A.3d at 397; Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 88–89
(1999).
73. See supra note 72.
74. See supra note 72.
75. See infra Appendix A.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 77–83.
77. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 n.22 (Mass. 2000) (holding an agreement to grant
the pre-embryos to the wife for implantation was unenforceable but expressing no view regarding
whether an agreement to donate or destroy the pre-embryos would be enforceable); Bilbao v.
Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, 992 (Conn. 2019) (limiting its holdings to only “contracts that, if enforced,
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jurisdictions have enforced or indicated that they would enforce an agreement
to use frozen pre-embryos,78 and some courts that have upheld contracts to
dispose of pre-embryos have explicitly stated that agreements to use the preembryos could be unenforceable for violating public policy.79 Courts may
also impose Statute of Frauds limitations on such contracts, such as by
requiring agreements to be in writing80 or requiring a clause on duration to
be included in the “essential terms” of the contract.81 Lastly, courts may limit
the force of form contracts or informed consent agreements prepared by IVF
clinics or cryobanks.82 For example, one court refused to interpret an
informed consent form as a contract between spouses, but left open the
possibility that a stand-alone agreement between the parties may be
enforceable.83 Therefore, contracts may be more or less restricted in a given
jurisdiction.84
ii. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
Jurisdictions that adopt the contemporaneous mutual consent approach
“maintain the status quo” by ordering that parties cannot use or dispose of
the pre-embryos and must keep them frozen until the parties can come to an
agreement.85 Jurisdictions that adopt this approach usually refuse to enforce
agreements to use the pre-embryos or grant rights to the person seeking to
use the pre-embryos.86 Proponents of this approach argue that it is impossible
will not result in procreation,” and declining to decide whether the contractual approach would
apply in such a case).
78. See infra Appendix A.
79. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 n. 4 (N.Y. 1998); Bilbao, 217 A.3d at 992.
80. See Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding another type
of family agreement, agreements for lifetime alimony-like support between unmarried live-in
partners upon separation, must be in writing and satisfy the Statute of Frauds). But see Szafranski
v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding that the parties “reached a binding
oral contract concerning the use of pre-embryos,” which granted consent to one party to use preembryos).
81. See In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 841 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (enforcing
the parties’ contract and noting that the agreement had a duration clause); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1056–
57 (holding that one reason the language in a consent form should not be enforced is that it did not
have a duration provision and the court should not assume the consent form was intended to govern
the dispute indefinitely).
82. See Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 447, 250 A.3d 373, 380 (2021) (“While we
do not condemn all form contracts . . . boilerplate language in third-party form contracts that lack
expression or direction from the progenitors will not qualify as an express agreement . . . .”).
83. Patel v. Patel, No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591, at *5 (Va. Cir. Sept. 7, 2017).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 77–83.
85. Pryor, supra note 69, at 1107; Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 476–77, 250 A.3d at 398.
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 2003). But see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 742.17(2) (West 2016) (recognizing enforceable contracts but otherwise prescribing the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach by stating that “[a]bsent a written agreement,
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to make intelligent decisions to give up a right in advance of the time that
right needs to be exercised, that it puts the decision in the hands of the parties
and avoids court involvement in people’s personal choices, and that it
upholds the right not to enter into parenthood.87 On the other hand, opponents
of this approach argue that it is unrealistic because if the parties could reach
an agreement on their own, they would not be in court.88 Opponents further
argue that this approach gives the party resisting use of the pre-embryos more
power during divorce settlements, allows one party to breach a contract on
which the other relies, gives no weight to the reproductive autonomy of the
person seeking to become a parent, and fails to recognize important
considerations for the party seeking to use pre-embryos, like the inability to
become a parent otherwise.89
iii. The Balancing Approach
Under the balancing approach, a court balances the interests of both
parties and rewards the pre-embryos to one side or the other.90 This approach
was first articulated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Davis v. Davis.91
There, the court adopted an initial contractual approach before balancing the
parties’ interests.92 Under that approach, the court first looks to the current
preferences of the parties.93 If there is a dispute, the court then looks to
whether there is a prior enforceable agreement between the parties.94 If there
is no enforceable agreement, the court balances the interests of both parties.95
Most courts that adopt the balancing approach use this multi-step analysis.96
In balancing the parties’ interests, the Davis court looked at “[1] the
positions of the parties, [2] the significance of their interests, and [3] the
relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions.”97 The Davis
court noted that ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should
decisionmaking authority regarding the disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with the
commissioning couple”).
87. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 477, 250 A.3d at 398; Coleman, supra note 72, at 88–89.
88. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 478–79, 250 A.3d at 399.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 479, 250 A.3d at 399; Pryor, supra note 69, at 1104.
91. 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 485, 250 A.3d 373, 403 (2021). But see J.B. v.
M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) (rejecting the contractual approach but holding that “the
interests of both parties must be evaluated” when there is a disagreement as to the disposition of
frozen pre-embryos).
97. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
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prevail, but the interest in using pre-embryos may be significant enough to
overcome that presumption if that party has no other means of achieving
parenthood.98 The court also noted that a person’s interest in donating a preembryo is weaker than an interest in using the pre-embryo for themselves.99
In In re Marriage of Rooks,100 the Colorado Supreme Court refined the
test from Davis. There, the court replaced Davis’s presumption that the
person seeking to avoid procreation should ordinarily prevail with the
instruction that the court should “strive, where possible, to honor both
parties’ interests in procreational autonomy.”101 Unlike the Davis court, the
Colorado Supreme Court recognized that both the right to procreate and the
right not to procreate are important interests and should be given equal
weight.102 The court also identified non-exhaustive factors to aid in weighing
the parties’ interests:
(1) “the intended use of the party seeking to preserve the disputed preembryos”;103
(2) “the demonstrated physical ability [or inability] of the party seeking
to implant the disputed pre-embryos to have biological children
through other means”;104
(3) “the parties’ original reasons for pursuing IVF”;105
(4) “hardship for the person seeking to avoid becoming a genetic
parent,
including
emotional,
financial,
or
logistical
considerations”;106

98. Id. at 604.
99. Id.
100. 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018).
101. Id. at 592.
102. Id. at 594.
103. Id. at 593. For example, a party who seeks to implant the pre-embryo has a weightier
interest than one who seeks to donate it. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. For example, whether the original reason was to conceive children together, or to
preserve fertility for one of the parties. Id.; see also Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding the frozen pre-embryos were created for “the sole purpose” of
“preserv[ing] [one party’s] ability to have a biological child . . . after her chemotherapy treatment
ended”).
106. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 593–94. Examples of such hardships include emotional toll of having a
separated family, see, for example, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992)
(explaining that, due to his own experience having divorced parents, Junior Davis was “vehemently
opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both parents”), or difficulty arranging custody
for current children, see, for example, Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 457, 250 A.3d
373, 386–87 (2021) (explaining that, during divorce proceedings, the district court had initially
entered a protective order limiting Joshua’s visitation rights with his current child, and Joshua
expressed concerns that he would be withheld time from his potential child if the pre-embryos were
granted to Jocelyn).
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(5) either party’s “demonstrated bad faith or attempt to use the preembryos as unfair leverage in the divorce proceedings”;107 and
(6) other factors “relevant on a case-by case basis.”108
The court also stressed that the size of the family, number of existing
children, or economic considerations, like whether the court believes the
party could support the child financially, are inappropriate considerations.109
Lastly, the court clarified that adoption should not be considered as an
alternative means of parenthood because the relevant interest at stake is
genetic parenthood.110
Proponents of the balancing approach argue that it recognizes that both
interests in reproductive autonomy—the decision to procreate and the
decision not to procreate—are important, and allows for flexibility based on
the individual circumstances of the case.111 Those that oppose this approach
argue it gives a court the final say to inject its own subjective opinion into
private reproductive decisions and allows a court to force one parent to
become a biological parent in violation of their right to reproductive
autonomy.112
3. Variations from the Three Major Approaches
While scholars and courts describe three separate approaches, courts use
a combination of these methods to resolve disputes regarding the disposition
of pre-embryos.113 For instance, from the first enunciation of the balancing
approach, the Davis court used a blend of all three methods of resolving preembryo disputes.114 First, the court looked to the current preferences of the
progenitors, i.e., it looked for contemporaneous mutual consent.115 If there
was a dispute, the court adopted the contractual approach by looking for a
prior enforceable agreement.116 The court only turned to the balancing
approach when there was no current prior agreement among the parties.117

107. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 594.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 593–94.
112. E.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000) (declining to enforce an agreement
regarding the disposition of pre-embryos on the grounds that it would be “forced procreation[,]
[which] is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement”).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 114–125.
114. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
115. Id. Because parties typically only resort to litigation when they cannot reach an agreement
on their own, this step rarely has any import.
116. Id.
117. Id.

2022] USING CONTRACT LAW TO RESOLVE PRE-EMBRYO DISPUTES

1061

By contrast, in J.B. v. M.B.,118 the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined
that state public policy would not allow enforcement of an agreement to
implant pre-embryos because it would “force[] [a party] to become a
biological parent against his or her will.”119 Therefore, the court rejected the
contractual approach step seen in Davis.120 Yet, the court still adopted the
balancing approach, at least on its face, holding that “the interests of both
parties must be evaluated” when there is disagreement as to the disposition
of the pre-embryos.121 However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s
balancing approach is significantly different from the balancing test
employed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Rooks.122 Unlike in Rooks, the
J.B. court retained the presumption from Davis that the right to avoid
parenthood should generally prevail.123 The J.B. court left open the
possibility that a party who has become infertile may have a strong enough
interest to overcome that presumption, although that is belied by the court’s
statement that the possibility of adoption may be considered as alternative
means to parenthood.124 This approach is directly at odds with the Rooks
opinion, which said that adoption should not be considered as an alternative
means of parenthood because the relevant interest at stake is genetic
parenthood.125
These cases exemplify that courts adopt a variety of approaches to
resolve pre-embryo disputes beyond the three categories described by
scholars and courts.126 In actuality, courts use a combination of the three
major approaches, and also include subtle differences even within those
approaches.127 Thus, the choices a court makes can be organized into two
categories: (1) what limits will be placed on contracts in this area, and (2)
118. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
119. Id. at 718. The court’s full opinion indicated it would enforce such agreement “subject to
the right of either party to change his or her mind about disposition up to the point of use or
destruction of any stored preembryos.” Id. at 719. The effect of this holding is that the agreement
will not be enforceable between the progenitors but will “permit[] fertility clinics and other like
facilities to rely on the[] terms [of the agreement].” Id. Other courts similarly do not enforce
contracts to use the pre-embryos against the progenitors but would enforce such contracts against
IVF clinics and storage facilities. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 n.22 (Mass.
2000) (holding that an agreement to grant one party use of the frozen pre-embryos is unenforceable
as between progenitors, but that “[t]here is no impediment to the enforcement of such contracts by
the clinics or by the donors against the clinics”).
120. J.B., 783 A.2d at 718.
121. Id. at 719.
122. Compare id. at 719–20, with In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 592, 594 (Colo. 2018).
123. Compare J.B., 783 A.2d at 719, with Rooks, 429 P.3d at 592.
124. J.B., 783 A.2d at 720.
125. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 594.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 114–125.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 114–125.
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how a court will resolve competing interests when there is no valid
contract.128
4. State Statutes May Be Binding in Some Jurisdictions or Play a
Significant Role in a Court’s Decision About Which Approach to
Adopt
Some states may have statutes that are dispositive.129 For example,
Louisiana law expressly forbids destruction of a pre-embryo, treating a preembryo as a “juridical person.”130 Florida also appears to have adopted the
contractual and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches by statute.131
Even when there are no statutes that directly address the disposition of
frozen pre-embryos, courts will often look to statutes to determine the public
policy of the state.132 For instance, in A.Z. v. B.Z., the court determined that
the public policy of the state discouraged enforcing agreements in matters of
family life.133 It looked at state statutes that forbid causes of action for
breaching a promise to marry and that render unenforceable agreements for
a mother to give up her child for adoption before it is five days old.134 By
contrast, in Roman v. Roman,135 the First District Court of Appeals of Texas
determined that public policy would permit enforcement of such contracts
after looking at state statutes upholding gestational surrogacy agreements and
requiring informed consent for assisted reproduction procedures.136
Therefore, the body of statutory law in a given jurisdiction will have a
significant role in which approach a court adopts.137
C. The Approach Adopted by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
As a preliminary matter, the court in Jocelyn P. held that pre-embryos
are due special respect “in light of their potential for human life as well as
the fundamental and coextensive rights of their progenitors to decide

128. See supra text accompanying notes 114–125.
129. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2018).
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (2016) (stating couples “shall enter into a written agreement that
provides for the disposition of the . . . preembryos in the event of a divorce” and “[a]bsent a written
agreement, decisionmaking authority regarding the disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly
with the commissioning couple”).
132. See infra Appendix A; see also, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058–59 (Mass. 2000).
133. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058–59.
134. Id.
135. 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006).
136. Id. at 48–49.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 129–136.
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‘whether to bear or beget a child.’”138 Since the court held that pre-embryos
are sui generis, the court did not apply marital property law but instead
applied court-made doctrine using the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions
regarding pre-embryo disputes.139
The court in Jocelyn P. adopted the Rooks iteration of the blended
contractual and balancing approach.140 The court determined that the
contractual approach was consistent with Maryland law because the
Maryland General Assembly recognizes agreements relating to family
matters of “alimony, support, property rights, or personal rights”141 as valid
and enforceable.142
The contractual approach, according to the court, should “focus[] most
prominently on the ‘four corners’ of any prior agreement.”143 The court
warned that form contracts provided by IVF clinics should be examined with
“special care” to determine if they manifest the progenitor’s intent, rather
than the IVF clinic’s boilerplate language, and noted that “courts should not
hesitate to turn to the balancing test to determine the progenitors’
constitutionally derived procreative rights.”144
The court found that Jocelyn and Joshua’s IVF contract, which was a
form contract prepared by the IVF clinic, was silent on what would happen
if the parties divorced.145 Joshua argued that the contract unambiguously
provided that the pre-embryo was “subject to disposition in a manner
mutually agreed upon.”146 However, the IVF contract provided that it was
the policy of the IVF clinic to resolve disposition “in a manner mutually
agreed upon by the partners.”147 The court found that this provision was
boilerplate language that did not manifest the progenitor’s intent but
indicated the policy that the IVF clinic would not do anything without both
parties’ consent or the final judgement of a court.148 With respect to the
parties, the contract provided that the disposition of the pre-embryos would
be determined in a manner “mutually agreed upon by the couple . . . except
in the cases of divorce.”149 In cases of divorce, the contract addressed when
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 468, 250 A.3d 373, 393 (2021).
Id. at 486, 250 A.3d at 404.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-101 (LexisNexis 2019).
Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 489, 250 A.3d at 405.
Id. at 488, 250 A.3d at 405.
Id. at 487–88, 250 A.3d at 404–05.
Id. at 491, 250 A.3d at 407. See supra text accompanying note 35.
Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 493, 250 A.3d at 408.
Id. at 450, 250 A.3d at 382.
Id. at 493, 250 A.3d at 408.
Id. at 450, 250 A.3d at 382.
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only one partner contributed gametes (in which case the gamete-provider
would get sole decision-making authority) but did not address what would
happen if both partners contributed gametes.150 The court therefore held that
the contract was silent on the issue at hand.151
The court remanded to determine if there was a binding oral agreement
between the parties since there was testimony that Jocelyn and Joshua had
discussed “at length” their intention to use every pre-embryo due to their
religious beliefs.152 If there was no oral agreement, the circuit court was to
balance Jocelyn’s interest in procreation and Joshua’s interest in avoiding
procreation.153
II. ANALYSIS
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals correctly adopted the blended
contractual and balancing approach,154 rather than striking down contracts
regarding the disposition of pre-embryos for violating public policy.155 The
contractual approach appropriately upholds the right to procreational
autonomy by allowing people to arrange their own affairs.156 However, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals should have gone further in upholding
contracts regarding the disposition of pre-embryos and engaged in a more
thorough analysis of contract doctrine.157 While the balancing approach is
preferable to the contemporaneous mutual consent approach because it
allows for consideration of the unique facts of each case, contract principles
are more predictable and provide a clearer rule for parties seeking to arrange
their families in the future.158
A. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals Correctly Adopted the
Blended Contractual and Balancing Approach
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals appropriately adopted the
blended contractual and balancing approach.159 The decision to undergo in
vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and to enter into parenthood is highly personal and
is a decision unique to each couple’s circumstances, beliefs, and
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 491, 250 A.3d at 407.
Id. at 494, 250 A.3d at 408.
Id. at 496, 250 A.3d at 409.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
See Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 486, 250 A.3d 373, 404 (2021).
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relationships.160 These decisions involve people with varying moral and
religious beliefs about what it means to be a family and when life is created.161
They involve married and unmarried couples who undergo IVF with various
goals in mind.162 They are decisions faced most often by people facing
infertility, sometimes due to medical treatment like chemotherapy.163 And
they may involve couples facing intense disagreement in divorce
proceedings, which a court’s pre-embryo decision will affect.164 Given the
large variety of circumstances surrounding pre-embryo decision-making,
courts should adopt an approach that honors an individual’s choice to create
whatever family arrangements they choose, as long as those decisions do not
harm another’s health or safety.165
The contractual approach, by enforcing contracts regarding the
disposition of frozen pre-embryos, upholds the individual’s right to arrange
their own family affairs.166 The American political and cultural tradition is
grounded in notions of individual liberty in areas of personal life.167 The
Federal Constitution protects substantive rights under the liberty prong of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,168 and the
160. See infra notes 161–164.
161. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) (explaining that, due to his
own experience having divorced parents, Junior Davis was “vehemently opposed to fathering a
child that would not live with both parents”); Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 455–56, 250 A.3d at 385–
86 (explaining that Jocelyn P. had strong religious views that each frozen pre-embryo was a life,
she was hesitant to undergo IVF due to her religious beliefs, and the parties had discussed “at length”
before going through the procedure that each embryo would be used because they had created life).
162. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (involving an unmarried
couple seeking to preserve fertility before chemotherapy treatment); Karungi v. Ejalu, No. 337152,
2017 WL 4272126, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2017) (involving an unmarried couple who
entered into IVF treatments after their relationship ended in order to give birth to a healthy child
who could provide umbilical cord stem cells to cure their already born, naturally conceived
daughter’s sickle cell disease).
163. See, e.g., Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d
at 1137.
164. See Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 457, 250 A.3d at 386–87 (explaining that, during divorce
proceedings, the district court had initially entered a protective order limiting Joshua’s visitation
rights with his current child, and Joshua expressed concerns that he would be withheld time from
his potential child if the pre-embryos were granted to Jocelyn).
165. MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS
SHAPE ALL KINDS OF FAMILIES 59 (2015).
166. See id.
167. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 327–28 (1990).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, cl. 3; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(“Without doubt, [the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
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Supreme Court has recognized liberty interests related to reproductive
decision-making.169 State constitutions also protect fundamental rights
inherent in individual liberty, including rights to privacy, personal autonomy,
and the right to procreate.170 Contracting allows people to exercise these
liberty interests in reproductive decision-making; it allows the individuals,
rather than a court, to make the decision that is best for their unique
circumstances, beliefs, and morals.171 The contractual approach also
promotes predictability by allowing those individuals to rely on their prior
agreements and avoids litigation by encouraging parties to consider their
decision to undergo IVF carefully and address potential disagreements before
they arise.172
By contrast, rendering such contracts unenforceable and instead
adopting the contemporaneous mutual consent approach takes away
procreational autonomy.173 By maintaining the status quo until the parties
can come to a more current agreement, it allows the party seeking to avoid
procreation to change their mind on an agreement that the other relied.174
Proponents of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach argue that it
upholds the right to procreational autonomy by championing the right to
make continuing and changing decisions about one’s reproduction.175
However, both the contractual approach and contemporaneous mutual
consent approach seek to uphold procreational autonomy and honor the
parties’ ability to structure their own affairs.176 Where they differ is a matter

169. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (“[T]he Constitution protects
individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”). The
Supreme Court’s recent leaked draft opinion overturning Roe v. Wade calls into question the
continuing recognition of a fundamental right to reproductive decision-making. SCOTUS Initial
Draft, POLITICO, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21835435-scotus-initial-draft (last
visited May 11, 2022). Absent a constitutionally protected right, states have unfettered discretion
on how far to expand their statutes to protect “potential life” after conception, which may include
restricting disposal of frozen pre-embryos. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Emily Wax-Thibodeaux,
Overturn of Roe Could Make IVF More Complicated, Costly, WASH. POST (May 11, 2022, 10:26
A.M.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/05/11/roe-overturn-ivf/.
Nevertheless,
whether or not the Supreme Court continues to recognize fundamental rights in matters of
childbearing, this Comment argues that states should adopt the contractual approach because it best
serves the interests of both parties.
170. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 599–600 (Tenn. 1992).
171. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
172. Id.
173. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 589 (Colo. 2018).
174. See Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 479, 250 A.3d 373, 399 (2021).
175. Coleman, supra note 72, at 126; Christina C. Lawrence, Procreative Liberty and the
Preembryo Problem: Developing a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the Disposition of
Frozen Embryos, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721, 729 (2002).
176. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 589.
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of timing.177 The contractual approach honors and encourages agreements in
advance of discord, while the contemporaneous mutual consent approach
requires agreement at the time of use or disposal.178 But, in effect, the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach only honors one party’s ability to
choose—the party who seeks to avoid use of the pre-embryos.179 If the
parties could come to a current mutual agreement, they would not be in
court.180 The contemporaneous mutual consent approach thus, by definition,
grants relief to the party seeking to avoid procreation.181 The practical effect
is that the party who depends on fertility treatments and family planning to
achieve biological parenthood has no ability to structure their family in a
reliable way, as the other party can change their mind and thwart those plans
at any time.182
Proponents of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach also argue
that it puts the decision in the hands of the parties rather than a court.183 But
there is no such thing as government non-involvement.184 Every decision,
even one to maintain the “status quo,” is a policy decision that someone will
experience as intervention.185 That is especially true when a court’s so-called
“non-intervention” is rendering invalid an agreement that one party relied
on.186 Whatever decision it makes, a court ultimately decides which party to
empower, and which to refuse to empower.187 In the context of divorce and
pre-embryo disputes, the choice to render agreements unenforceable and
maintain the “status quo” gives power to the person seeking to avoid
procreation.188 For instance, maintaining the status quo will give the party
seeking to avoid procreation more power in divorce proceedings by allowing
them to use their consent to use the pre-embryos as leverage to achieve a
desired result on other matters in the divorce settlement.189 This result will
make divorce proceedings more volatile and more likely to result in

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 478, 250 A.3d 373, 399 (2021).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 596 (Hood, J., dissenting).
184. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
835, 843, 859 (1985).
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 864.
188. Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business): Recent
Trends in Awards Involving Embryos upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1221, 1225 (2009).
189. Id. at 1221.
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litigation.190 This distribution of power between the parties will in turn affect
the decisions people make about families and family planning.191 For
instance, someone who has strong religious views about the creation of life,
like Jocelyn P., may not undergo IVF at all without the assurance that each
pre-embryo will be used.192 Someone who seeks to preserve their fertility
through IVF may be advised to use gametes from an anonymous donor rather
than a spouse or long-term partner to avoid risking that their ability to use the
pre-embryos, which they went through so much effort to create, will be
revoked.193 For these reasons, the contractual approach more appropriately
upholds the procreational autonomy of both parties, and recognizes that there
are circumstances where the interest in procreation is stronger than the
interest in avoiding procreation.194
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach is a one-size-fits-all
approach that applies the same remedy to every solution—do nothing and
leave it to the parties to work it out.195 But as each of these cases is unique,
involving complex situations and people with unique circumstances, morals,
and beliefs, a one-size-fits-all approach can only do more harm than
justice.196 For instance, in Jocelyn P., both parties testified that under their
religious beliefs they felt they had created life, and even Joshua testified that
donating the pre-embryo would satisfy their “religious take on this situation
that life is obviously very valuable.”197 The contemporaneous mutual
consent approach would order that the pre-embryos remain in limbo, and
therefore would remain unused until time renders the issue void, either
because the party who sought to use the pre-embryo has grown older, the
parties can no longer support the cost to store the pre-embryos, the storage
facility will no longer store the pre-embryo, or any other reason.198 By
190. Id. at 1225 (“Courts using the contemporaneous consent model give each progenitor a
powerful bargaining chip at a time when individuals might very well be tempted to punish their
soon-to-be ex-spouses. As a matter of public policy, this makes no sense and may invite individuals
to hold hostage their ex-partner’s ability to parent a biologically related child in order to punish or
to gain other advantages.”).
191. Olsen, supra note 184, at 837.
192. See Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 494, 250 A.3d 373, 408 (2021).
193. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
194. See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 589 (Colo. 2018).
195. Pryor, supra note 69, at 1119.
196. Patel v. Patel, No. CL16000156-00, 2017 WL 11453591, at *5 (Va. Cir. Sept. 7, 2017)
(“[The contemporaneous mutual consent approach] only keeps the parties in perpetual limbo—
seemingly creating more of a hardship against the person who does not desire destruction of the
embryos, without considering the specific interests of the parties.”).
197. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 458, 250 A.3d at 387.
198. See, e.g., Jessee v. Jessee, 866 S.E.2d 46, 50 (Va. Ct. App. 2021) (explaining that the party
seeking to use the frozen pre-embryo in dispute believed that “[a]t forty-three years of age . . .
[given] her decreased fertility and limited finances, it might be her only remaining opportunity to
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contrast, the contractual approach allows a court to consider whether there
was an oral contract to use each pre-embryo, either by Jocelyn or through
donation, which would allow a more equitable solution that satisfies both
parties’ religious views.199 Not only does the blended contractual and
balancing approach provide flexibility to remedy a broad range of factspecific cases, but the contractual approach also puts that flexibility in the
hands of the parties who can decide what is most important to them when
their judgement is not clouded by disagreement and animosity towards the
party they are litigating against.200 It allows an unmarried couple to conceive
through IVF in order to give birth to a healthy child who could provide
umbilical cord stem cells to cure their first-born daughter’s sickle cell
disease,201 a person with cancer to preserve her fertility before undergoing
chemotherapy using gametes from a person she knows and trusts,202 and a
father strongly opposed to raising a child who does not live with both parents
to ensure frozen pre-embryos will not be used without his consent.203 This
flexibility is not present under the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach’s one-size-fits-all model.204
Additionally, the choice to maintain the status quo will have a
disproportionate impact on people with ovaries.205 The process for extracting
ovum is more invasive, intensive, expensive, and time-consuming than the
process for receiving sperm, which places a greater burden on people with
ovaries if they must go through the procedures again.206 Additionally, ova
are only viable until a person reaches a certain age, while people who produce
sperm typically remain fertile throughout their lives.207 Thus, when a court
have a biological child”). See also Caroline Strohe, The Fate of Frozen Embryos After Divorce: A
Call for Courts to Properly Balance Procreative Freedom, 66 LOY. L. REV. 263, 285 (2020).
199. See Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 494, 250 A.3d at 408.
200. See id. at 474–75, 250 A.3d at 393–94, 397.
201. Karungi v. Ejalu, No. 337152, 2017 WL 4272126, at *1 (Mich Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2017).
202. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
203. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992).
204. Pryor, supra note 69, at 1119.
205. This includes people assigned female at birth and intersex people with ovaries. To read
more on infertility in intersex people, see generally Jolanta Slowikowska-Hilczer et al., Fertility
Outcome and Information on Fertility Issues in Individuals with Different Forms of Disorders of
Sex Development: Findings from the DSD-LIFE Study, 108 FERTILITY & STERILITY 822 (2017).
206. See Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 453, 455–56, 250 A.3d 373, 384–86 (2021).
207. Having a Baby After Age 35: How Aging Affects Fertility and Pregnancy, AM. COLL.
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, https://www.acog.org/womens-health/faqs/having-a-babyafter-age-35-how-aging-affects-fertility-andpregnancy#:~:text=A%20woman’s%20peak%20reproductive%20years,is%20unlikely%20for%20
most%20women (last visited May 4, 2022) (explaining that women have a fixed number of eggs,
and fertility begins to decline at age thirty) [hereinafter Having a Baby After Age 35]; Isiah D. Harris
et al., Fertility and the Aging Male, 13 REVS. UROLOGY e184, e185 (2011) (explaining that men
over forty also experience fertility decline, but age still has a greater impact on female fertility).
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refuses to enforce a contract to use frozen pre-embryos, people with ovaries
will have a limited timeframe in which they can undergo further IVF
procedures to achieve pregnancy.208 As pregnancies later in life also have
higher risk of complications, even if a party who previously sought to use the
pre-embryos later agreed to implantation, the delay caused by the
contemporaneous mutual consent approach can cause higher risk pregnancies
for those who seek to carry their own children to term.209
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach will also have a
disproportionate impact on people who rely on assisted reproductive
technologies to achieve biological parenthood, like those who face infertility
and LGBTQ families.210 The most devastating effect might be on those who
choose IVF to preserve fertility before undergoing medical treatments that
can cause infertility, like chemotherapy or gender-affirming care, as the preembryos created could be the last opportunity to achieve biological
parenthood. 211 Further, people who are at the intersection of these groups
face even starker difficulties. For instance, frozen ovum historically were not
as viable as frozen pre-embryos;212 the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine only determined in 2013 that freezing ovum should no longer be
considered an experimental procedure.213 Thus, although freezing ovum is
more viable today, cisgender women who received fertility treatment before
2013 likely would have been incentivized to freeze pre-embryos rather than
ova to achieve a higher chance of successful pregnancy.214 Cisgender men,

208. See Having a Baby After Age 35, supra note 207.
209. Id.
210. Most, if not all, of the cases that have dealt with pre-embryo disputes have involved women
with fertility issues. See infra Appendix A.
211. How Cancer and Cancer Treatment Can Affect Fertility in Females, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/physical-side-effects/fertility-andsexual-side-effects/fertility-and-women-with-cancer/how-cancer-treatments-affect-fertility.html
(last updated Feb. 6, 2020); How Cancer and Cancer Treatment Can Affect Fertility in Males, AM.
CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/physical-sideeffects/fertility-and-sexual-side-effects/fertility-and-men-with-cancer/how-cancer-treatmentsaffect-fertility.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2020); Philip J. Cheng et al., Fertility Concerns of the
Transgender Patient, 8 TRANSLATIONAL ANDROLOGY & UROLOGY 209, 210, 211–12 (2019).
212. Cryopreserved, unfertilized ovum historically had limited success with respect to
fertilization and pregnancy rates because the oocyte’s “large size, water content, and chromosomal
arrangement” made it susceptible to “damage[] by intracellular ice formation during the freezing
and thawing process.” Prac. Comms. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. & Soc’y for Assisted
Reprod. Tech., Mature Oocyte Cryopreservation: A Guideline, 99 ASRM PAGES 37, 37–38 (2013).
Fertilized ovum, i.e., pre-embryos, were historically more likely to result in pregnancy. See id. at
39.
213. Changes in the cryopreservation process to use slow-freeze methods have improved oocyte
survival in more recent years. Id. at 37–38, 41.
214. See id.
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by contrast, would not have had to resort to IVF, as sperm has been
successfully frozen for much longer.215
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach’s disparate impact on
women is not mere coincidence but is consistent with the history of rendering
familial contracts unenforceable.216 Under the traditional common law
doctrine of coverture, married women could not enter into contracts—“the
very being or legal existence of [a] woman [was] suspended during the
marriage.”217 As society becomes more progressive, it moves from limiting
roles in society based on status towards recognizing people’s individual
rights in their ability to contract.218 Contracting empowers women and others
to exercise their right to liberty and, in this case, procreational autonomy.219
Pre-embryo disputes are just the most recent example of law perpetuating
gender roles and limiting families to traditional, nuclear entities—often to the
detriment of women, LGBTQ people, and other non-nuclear families who
rely on these technologies.220 Thus, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
correctly upheld contracts regarding the disposition of pre-embryos, rather
than holding that they are void for violating public policy.221
B. Contracts Regarding the Disposition of Pre-Embryos Should Not
Be Struck Down for Reasons of Public Policy
The court in Jocelyn P. noted that the blended contractual and balancing
approach was consistent with Maryland law.222 The court drew on statutory
law that recognizes enforceable agreements between married couples relating
to “alimony, support, property rights, or personal rights,”223 and prior court
opinions recognizing public interest in liberty in allowing people to structure
their own affairs through contract.224 The court appropriately recognized that
the interest to avoid procreation and the interest to procreate were equally

215. See id. at 37 (“The first human birth from frozen sperm was reported in 1953.”).
216. Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Research
Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 459–60 (2002).
217. Id. at 460 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
IN FOUR BOOKS *442 (1809)).
218. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 139–41 (1905).
219. See id.
220. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 159, 159 (2013).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 159–220.
222. Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 489, 250 A.3d 373, 405 (2021).
223. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-101 (2019).
224. Jocelyn P., 250 Md. App. at 489, 250 A.3d at 405 (first citing Md. Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan.
Comm’n v. Wash. Nat. Arena, 282 Md. 588, 606, 386 A.2d 1216, 1229 (1978); then citing Clark v.
O’Malley, 186 Md. App. 194, 224, 973 A.2d 821, 838–39 (2009)).
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important,225 and that contracts which require use of the pre-embryos are
enforceable.226
Critics of the contractual approach worry it undermines a person’s right
not to procreate.227 Thus, the crux of the issue is implicated when the court
considers enforcing an agreement that allows one party to use the preembryos.228 The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of
pre-embryo disputes upheld at least some contracts regarding pre-embryo
disposition.229 However, most of those courts have not addressed whether
they would uphold contracts to use the frozen pre-embryos; rather, they have
upheld contracts that require disposal of the pre-embryos.230 Some of the
jurisdictions that have not addressed whether they would uphold contracts to
use the frozen pre-embryos explicitly left open the possibility that such
agreements could be unenforceable for violating public policy.231
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts instructs that a contract may be
void on grounds of public policy for two reasons: (1) “if legislation provides
that it is unenforceable,” or (2) if a court finds that the interest in its
enforcement is “clearly outweighed” by public policy reasons against its
enforcement.232 Under the second prong, the interests in enforcement of the
terms include “(a) the parties’ justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture that
would result if enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public interest
in the enforcement of the particular term.”233 The public policy reasons
opposing enforcement of the terms include “(a) the strength of that policy as
manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal
to enforce the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of any
misconduct . . . and (d) the directness of the connection between that
225. Id. at 486, 250 A.3d at 404.
226. Id. at 494, 250 A.3d at 408.
227. Coleman, supra note 72, at 126.
228. See id.
229. Nineteen jurisdictions have addressed the issue; fourteen upheld at least some contracts
regarding pre-embryo disputes, see infra Appendix A, although one jurisdiction only upheld
contracts between unmarried persons, see Terrell v. Torres, 456 P.3d 13, 15 (Ariz. 2020); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (2018). Additionally, one court indicated that it may uphold contracts
to dispose of pre-embryos, but it would not enforce an agreement that would result in procreation.
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 n. 22 (Mass. 2000).
230. Only six jurisdictions have either enforced or indicated they would enforce an agreement
to use the frozen pre-embryos. See infra Appendix A.
231. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 n.4 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that such agreements may “be
unenforceable as violative of public policy,” although the parties did not bring a public policy
argument in that case); Bilbao v. Goodwin, 217 A.3d 977, 992 (Conn. 2019) (declining to decide
whether a contract “that would force one party to become a genetic parent against his or her wishes”
would be unenforceable for reasons of public policy).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
233. Id. § 178(2).
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misconduct and the term.”234 None of the courts that struck down the
contractual approach had state legislation expressly directing that pre-embryo
contracts are unenforceable.235 Yet, the courts did not engage in a balancing
test to weigh the interest in enforcement against the public policy reasons
opposing enforcement.236 Instead, the courts cherry-picked old law to
determine that their states had a public policy against enforcement of preembryo contracts, then failed to balance that supposed policy against the
interests in enforcement.237
All of the courts that have rejected the contractual approach evinced
their state’s public policy by reviewing state legislation and prior case law.238
In justifying their determinations of public policy, each of those cases drew
on, among other things, laws limiting causes of action for promises to marry,
meaning the court will not require a person to marry another even though
they promised to do so.239 Yet, those same jurisdictions allow enforceable
agreements in other contexts, like gestational surrogacy.240 For example, in
In re Marriage of Witten,241 which was decided in 2003, the Supreme Court
of Iowa relied in part on attenuated case law from the years 1889 and 1905
that held promises to marry and contracts for spouses “to behave
respectfully[] and fairly treat the other” were unenforceable.242 The court
made no mention of the fact that in 1989 the legislature had recognized valid
surrogacy agreements by excluding them from its prohibition on the “sale of
[an] individual.”243 This suggests that the determination of public policy is
to some extent arbitrary, as it permits courts to rely on old doctrine to
reinforce gender roles and notions of the traditional family rather than focus
on the current state of the law and public sentiment regarding reproductive
technology.244
Relying on old law to address new problems is particularly problematic
in the context of reproductive technology because it fails to recognize how
reproductive technology and the laws surrounding it are changing as its use
234. Id. § 178(3).
235. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768, 781–82 (Iowa 2003); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717–18 (N.J. 2001).
236. See supra note 235.
237. See, e.g., J.B., 783 A.2d at 717–18.
238. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058; Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781–82; J.B., 783 A.2d at 717–18. See
infra Appendix A.
239. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058; Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781–82; J.B., 783 A.2d at 717–18.
240. See The United States Surrogacy Law Map, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS,
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
241. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
242. Id. at 781 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641, 641 (1889)).
243. IOWA CODE § 710.11 (1989).
244. See Matsumura, supra note 220, at 177–78.
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becomes more common.245 For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
relied on its decision in In re Baby M.246 from 1988, which struck down a
surrogacy agreement where the surrogate mother was genetically related to
the child, to determine that there is a public policy against enforcing contracts
regarding familial relationships.247 Consider that the first child born through
IVF treatment in the United States was in 1981, only seven years prior to In
re Baby M.248 The number of children born in the United States that were
conceived through assisted reproductive technology has increased rapidly
since then, and has more than doubled in just the last ten years.249 More
recent legislative initiatives in New Jersey reflect this change; for instance,
New Jersey’s Gestational Carrier Act250 upholds gestational carrier
agreements.251 Striking down agreements on public policy grounds without
properly balancing the interests for and against enforcement thus stunts the
ability of the law to reflect those changes in reproductive technology and its
use that have been seen in the decades since those decisions.252
Even if the statutes and judicial decisions of the jurisdiction do evince a
policy against enforcement of contracts to use pre-embryos,253 the courts
failed to engage in a thorough analysis balancing the strength of that policy
against the interest in enforcing the terms.254 Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, to render a term unenforceable on grounds of public
policy, a court should weigh the interest in enforcement of the terms with the
public policy against enforcement of the terms.255 With contracts regarding
the disposition of frozen pre-embryos, the interests in favor of enforcement
include that (a) the party seeking to enforce the agreement underwent the IVF
procedure with the reasonable expectation that the other party would adhere
to their agreement; (b) denying enforcement could forfeit the ability of that

245. See infra text accompanying notes 246–251.
246. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
247. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717–18 (N.J. 2001).
248. Nugent, supra note 1.
249. Compare ART Success Rates, supra note 3 (reporting that, in 2019, 2.1% of children born
in the United State were conceived through ART), with CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES—NATIONAL SUMMARY AND
FERTILITY
CLINIC
REPORTS
15
(2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/archived/ART_2009_Full_508tagged.pdf (reporting that, in 2009, 1%
of children born in the United States were conceived through ART).
250. 2018 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 18 (West).
251. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-60–71 (West 2018).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 246–251.
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
254. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d
768 (Iowa 2003); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981).

2022] USING CONTRACT LAW TO RESOLVE PRE-EMBRYO DISPUTES

1075

party to have biological children; and (c) there is a public interest in the right
to procreate and the ability to order one’s own affairs through contract.256 By
contrast, the public policy interests against enforcement are questionable,
given that (a) the public policy interests against enforcing familial contracts
are not strong because most jurisdictions uphold some family contracts, like
prenuptial agreements and gestational surrogacy agreements; (b) refusal of
the term both furthers the procreational liberty for one party and impedes
procreational liberty for another; and (c) there is usually no evidence of
misconduct, which composes two of the four factors weighing against
enforcement.257 Failure to engage in a legitimate balancing evinces a court’s
desire to conform its opinion to traditional notions of what a family and
parenthood should look like, rather than engage in a true thorough and
thoughtful analysis of public policy.258 Therefore, courts generally should
not strike down pre-embryo contracts as a matter of public policy, absent
legislation to do so otherwise, because the public interest in enforcing the
term generally weighs in favor of enforcement when compared to the public
policy against enforcement.259
Like courts that have rejected the contractual approach, Maryland also
has a statute limiting the cause of action for breach of promise to marry.260
However, Maryland law permits people to structure their families in other
ways, like by allowing surrogate mothers to relinquish parental status,261 or
allowing non-genetic parents to gain parental status through de facto
parenthood.262 Thus, like many jurisdictions, Maryland has contrasting law
that could be used to contrive the public policy of the state.263 However, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals appropriately found there was no
contrary public policy.264

256. See id. § 178(2).
257. Id. § 178(3).
258. See Matsumura, supra note 220, at 174–77 (explaining that in the absence of state statutes
addressing the issue directly, courts either rely on old policies used to invalidate other types of
intimate agreements, and/or rely on policies adopted to enhance reproductive choice in order to
further a contrary policy to limit reproductive choice).
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
260. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 3-102 (2019).
261. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 271, 285, 923 A.2d 115, 117, 126 (2007).
262. Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 85, 146 A.3d 443, 453 (2016). De facto parenthood is
recognition of custody or visitation rights with a child not based on biological relation or status as
adoptive parent but based on the party’s prior relationship with the child. Id. at 62, 146 A.3d at 439.
263. See supra notes 260–262.
264. Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 489, 250 A.3d 373, 405 (2021).
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C. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals Afforded Too Little
Deference to Contractual Principles
While the Maryland Court of Special Appeals correctly adopted the
contractual approach, it incorrectly held that the court “should not hesitate to
turn to the balancing test.”265 To the contrary, a court should seek to
determine the parties’ intent as evidenced by the writings and other evidence
as much as possible.266 Proponents of each approach agree that whatever
policy is adopted should be the one that upholds the parties’ interests in
procreational autonomy and allows the parties to choose the disposition of
the pre-embryos to the greatest extent possible.267 As explained above,
contracts are the best way to uphold procreational autonomy and provide the
“clear, consistent principles [needed] to guide parties in protecting their
interests and resolving their disputes.”268 While “[t]he subject of [preembryo] dispute[s] may be novel . . . the common-law principles governing
contract interpretation are not.”269 Contract principles are an ancient
foundation of our society; it is sometimes said that “all organized society
began in a voluntary contract.”270 As such, contract principles tend to reflect
our reasonable expectations and provide more predictable outcomes than the
balancing approach.271 By contrast, the balancing test is a case-by-case,
court-made doctrine that applies uniquely in this area and is subject to a
court’s own biases.272 The result is uncertain and parties cannot rely on the
outcome of the balancing test to protect their interests.273 Thus, rather than
limiting the use of contractual principles, a court should limit the use of the
balancing test.274
Before turning to the balancing test, a court should engage in thorough
analysis using contract principles. The court in Jocelyn P. found that the IVF
form contract provided by the fertility clinic did not manifest the progenitor’s
265. Id. at 488, 250 A.3d at 405.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 267–280.
267. See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 595 (Colo. 2018) (adopting the blended
contractual and balancing approach to “honor both parties’ interests in procreational autonomy”);
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (adopting the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach to enhance “respect for liberty and privacy . . . [in] the freedom to decide whether to enter
into a family relationship”).
268. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998).
269. Id. at 180.
270. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 591 (1933).
271. See supra Section II.A.
272. See supra Section I.B.2.iii.
273. See supra Section I.B.2.iii.
274. To be sure, the balancing test is better than the contemporaneous mutual consent approach;
it at least allows a court to consider a wealth of evidence based on the unique facts of the case, rather
than applying a one-size-fits-all approach. See Strohe, supra note 198, at 285–87.
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intent concerning the disposition of the pre-embryos upon divorce.275 While
the form contract may not have sufficiently certain terms to constitute a
contract, a court should look to other sources of evidence, and allow the
parties to submit parol evidence and testimony of prior understandings and
conversations.276 Furthermore, while a few courts have declined to find
implied contracts in this area,277 there may be room for implying terms that
“comport[] with community standards of fairness and policy.”278
Additionally, relying on contract law will not result in hardship to either
the party seeking to use the pre-embryos or the party seeking to avoid
procreation, as both will have contract defenses of promissory estoppel279 and
changed circumstances,280 respectively.
III. CONCLUSION
The majority of jurisdictions have appropriately adopted the blended
contractual and balancing approach,281 rather than striking down such

275. Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P., 250 Md. App. 435, 491, 250 A.3d 373, 407 (2021).
276. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1981) (explaining
that when an essential term is omitted, prior negotiations or a prior agreement may supply the term
if the written agreement was not integrated, that is, not complete and exclusive. If the agreement
was completely integrated, parol evidence may still be relevant to show what terms are reasonable
for the court to supply under the circumstances).
277. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992); In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579,
592 (Colo. 2018).
278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981). For
instance, when parties create frozen pre-embryos to preserve fertility prior to medical treatment that
will result in infertility, absent an agreement, there may be an implied term comporting with fairness
and policy that the pre-embryos were created to preserve fertility and should be granted to the
infertile party seeking to use them. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1148–53 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2015) (declining to read into the contract a limitation that would restrict use of the pre-embryos
since the purpose of the contract was to preserve one party’s ability to have a biological child after
chemotherapy, the parties knew the pre-embryos would be cryopreserved for later use, and imposing
such a limitation would fundamentally change the contract). On the other hand, when a couple
undergoes IVF after unsuccessful attempts to become pregnant through coitus, there may be an
implied term that the intent was to have a child as a couple, and thus the pre-embryos should not be
granted to either party for use. For instance, although the Davis court declined to find an implied
contract and instead engaged in a balancing test, the court could have reached the same result if it
had found an implied contract. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598, 604. The court noted that there was
“no indication in the record . . . that Junior Davis intended to pursue reproduction outside the
confines of a continuing marital relationship” and that Junior was “vehemently opposed” to single
parenting due to his own experience with having divorced parents. Id. The court could have instead
used these facts to find that, under an implied contract, standards of fairness and policy direct that
the pre-embryos were to be used as a married couple. Id.
279. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1164 (leaving open the possibility of a promissory estoppel claim).
280. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179–80 n.4 (N.Y. 1998) (leaving open the possibility of a
changed circumstance defense).
281. See infra Appendix A.
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contracts for reasons of public policy.282 The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals correctly joined this trend in its decision in Jocelyn P. v. Joshua P.283
The contractual approach upholds the right to procreational autonomy by
allowing people to arrange their own affairs, while the contemporaneous
mutual consent approach only gives one party the right to choose—the party
seeking to avoid use of the pre-embryos.284 Striking down contracts has a
disproportionate effect on women, infertile people, and LGBTQ families,
who rely on reproductive technologies to have biological children.285 The
law should not unfairly impose this burden of uncertainty on them.286
Furthermore, courts who do strike down contracts as violating public policy
typically cherry-pick doctrine in a way that serves to enforce gender norms
and traditional notions of what a family should look like.287 That decision
also freezes the law in its place in an area that is rapidly changing and needs
the law to reflect those changes.288 Although the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals adopted the correct approach, it should have gone further in
upholding contracts regarding the disposition of pre-embryos.289 Courts
should engage in a thorough analysis of contract doctrine before turning to
the balancing approach because contract law is more predictable and provides
the guidance needed for people to protect their interest.290 The Maryland
Court of Special Appeal’s decision, and all states who follow suit, better
serves its citizens by upholding the right to procreate and allowing them to
rely on their partner’s word when they decide to undertake the life-changing
decision to start a family through IVF.291

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See supra Section II.B.
250 Md. App. 435, 250 A.3d 373 (2021).
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
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APPENDIX A: Survey of Legal Approaches to Frozen Pre-Embryo
Disputes*

* States omitted from this appendix have not yet meaningfully addressed the issue of preembryo disputes. Cases were not included when they were unreported and only addressed the
question in a conclusory manner.
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